We ask how reform of migration law intended to increase the selectivity of migration (the so-called integration agreement regulation in 2003) in Austria impacted on the education structure of migrants to Austria. To identify the effects of this reform, we use the fact that it applied only to migrants from third countries and not those from EEA-countries. We find no compelling evidence that this regulation improved the education structure of migrants to Austria. Our interpretation of this is that the implicit positive impact of the reforms on the education structure of migrants was countervailed by the increased restrictiveness of the migration regime overall, or that other developments in the migration regime were more important for changes in education structure in the time period considered.
I. Introduction
In the last two decades, the share of foreign born residing in Austria more than tripled. In 1990, a mere 5% of the total resident population in Austria was born outside the country. In 2008, this applied to over 16%. 3 One of the consequences of this increase was an intensive debate on appropriate migration and integration policies, which resulted in repeated and intensive policy changes. In particular, three reforms mark the history of migration policy in Austria in this time period. These were the introduction of a foreigner and a residence law robustness issues. Finally, section 8 summarizes our findings and discusses their relevance for migration policy.
II. Institutional Background: Migration law in Austria
When the Iron Curtain came down in 1989, this marked the end of traditional Austrian migration policy, which was based on a temporary foreign guest worker model. New groups of migrant workers came to Austria -from Central and Eastern Europe and from other parts of the world. Additionally, as a result of the civil war in former Yugoslavia, a large number of refugees moved to Austria. The inflow of foreigners to Austria increased notably. In only a few years, the share of the foreign population in Austria grew from 4.5% (1989) to 7% (1992) . In consequence, migration rules were tightened in the early 1990s -beginning with an amended Foreign Worker Law in 1990. According to this amendment, the share of foreign labor in the Austrian labor market was limited to 10% and reduced twice in 1993, first to 9% and later to 8%. Additionally, the number of foreign workers in agriculture and tourism was limited by quota in 1994. In addition to the amendment to the Foreign Worker Law in 1993, the Alien Law ("Fremdengesetz") and Residence Law ("Aufenthaltsgesetz") also came into force. The latter regulated the first entry, stay and residence of foreigners and restricted the number of people permitted to settle in Austria by quota. According to these laws, from 1993 onwards, governors of the federal states of Austria together with the ministries of the interior and labor fixed the region specific residence quota (which henceforth coexisted with the labor market access quota) on an annual basis. Differences by residence status in each region came into force in 1996, with the quota differentiated by family reunion, employment and private persons. Also, special rules excluded some migrant groups (such as some family members or some groups of migrant workers) 4 or asylum seekers from quota regulation. In 1994, Austria joined the EEA. Since that time, only non-EEA-citizens are restricted by the residence quota when coming to Austria and need work permits for labor market access -with the continuing exceptions for some groups of foreigners and foreign workers from non-EEA-countries. In August 1997, new legislation regulating the residence and settlement of persons of third country origin was passed and came into effect in 1998. The new legislation -the Alien Law ("Fremdengesetz 1997") -regulated short stays and long-term residence of persons from third countries. It was intended to facilitate the integration of family members who had arrived before 1992 into the labor market, with the quota remaining largely unaffected. Further comprehensive revision of the Alien and Residence Law (the so-called integration agreement regulation) entered into force on January 1, 2003. According to this amendment, the settlement of new low skilled workers of third country origin without family members in Austria was no longer possible. The permanent labor migration quota was restricted to the highly educated employed, family reunion and to private persons without labor market access. Thus, in effect this regulation made immigration to Austria more difficult, while at the same time easing conditions for the highly skilled. However, as before, a number of persons of third country origin could still settle in Austria outside the quota system. These were, in particular, the partners and family members of Austrians and EEA-citizens, who were third country citizens, persons working for foreign media, artists and settlers on humanitarian grounds 5 . The total quota amounted to 8,070 persons in 2003, of which 8,027 were actually used. Of these, 934 were taken by high skilled employed and 6,517 by family reunion. By contrast, the total number of first settlement permits for foreigners of third country origin outside the quota system amounted to 26,537. At the same time, short-time, contingent work by foreign workers was restricted by a maximum number of initial work permits. Contingent work permits are valid for six months and can be extended for another six months at most. After one year of employment, contingent foreign workers have to leave Austria for two months. The number of initial work permits for contingent foreign workers of third country origin amounted to 8,000 in 2003. This temporary residence status does not allow permanent residence and family reunion. In addition, the number of initial work permits for agricultural workers, who were allowed to work in the agricultural sector for a maximum of six weeks, amounted to 7,000.
Finally, in 2005, the legislation regarding foreigners was once more fundamentally revised, affecting the regulation of residence and settlement ("Niederlassungs-und Aufenthaltsgesetz"), Alien Police Law ("Fremdenpolizeigesetz") and asylum seekers ("Asylgesetz") and came into force on January 1, 2006. The legislation was aligned with existing EU guidelines (Biffl 2007) . Hence, the annual quota for long-term immigration, which contained the quota for family reunion, highly skilled employed, highly skilled self-employed and private persons, were augmented by the quota for permanent residents of third country origin in another EU-country (employed, self-employed, private persons) and for transferred permits ("Zweckänderungen"). Highly skilled migrants were still committed to fulfill the various requirements. Additionally, family reunion was hampered by income requirements. New residence permits outside the quota system were restricted to family members and new settlers of third country origin with no or limited labor market access.
III. Theoretical Considerations
In summary, from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, Austrian migration policy was marked by three developments. First, migration law, which had been based on the presumption of (temporary) guest worker migration until the late 1980s, increasingly moved in the direction of a more settlement based model of regulation. Second, changes in migration law also reflected attempts to reduce inflows of migrants by making the migration regime more restrictive. Finally, increasing the education content of migration by making migration law increasingly selective was a third recurring theme of migration law reforms. Our interest in this paper is with the last of these objectives. To analyze this, we start from a simple model of migrant selectivity in which we consider two countries (indexed by j ∈ f, h, with h denoting the sending and f the receiving country). We assume that individuals (indexed by i) differ with respect to education (s i ) and derive utility from (expected lifetime) income (w i j ) which depends on education according to the function:
where that ln(s i ) is normally distributed with mean µ s and standard deviation σ S and θ j measures country specific returns to migration. Furthermore, we assume that the (financial, administrative and psychological) costs of migration (K) are given by fixed financial and administrative costs of migration (k 0 ) that have to be paid by everyone, an education dependent cost component (k 1 ), so that costs of migration are given as:
where, in accordance with empirical results by Hunt (2004) , who finds that the highly educated often have access to low-cost migration channels, for example as posted workers, we assume that the highly educated face ceteris paribus lower costs of migration. Given these assumptions, individuals with (θ f − θ h + k 1 ) ln(s i ) > ω h − ω f + k 0 will migrate and all others will stay. Thus in the case that θ f − θ h + k 1 > 0 all persons with an education level satisfying ln(
migrate. As amply demonstrated in the literature on migrant selectivity (e.g. Borjas 1999 and Chiswick 2000) , migrants will therefore be more highly educated than stayers (positively self-selected) if the returns from education (net of education dependent migration costs) in the receiving country are higher than in the sending country (i.e. θ f + k 1 > θ h ) and negatively self-selected if the opposite applies (i.e. θ f + k 1 < θ h ). In addition, assuming that policy can influence education dependent costs of migration (k 1 ) it is easy to see that an increase in k 1 (i.e. a move to a more selective migration policy) will decrease the education level of migrants in countries where positive self-selection prevails and increase education levels in countries where negative self-selection prevails. In this respect, previous research (Belot and Hatton, 2008, and Huber et al. 2010) suggests that migrants in Austria are negatively self-selected. In particular, Belot and Hatton (2008) show that the share of highly educated migrants is 0.3 percentage points lower than could be predicted from the education structure of the sending countries alone. This suggests that the introduction of the integration agreement regulation should have improved the education structure of migrants to Austria. However, as noted above, the integration agreement regulation, aside from increasing education selectivity, also made overall migration conditions more restrictive and thus also influenced the parameter k 0 . For this parameter, it can be shown that, if migrants are positively self-selected, an increase in these fixed migration costs will increase the expected education levels of migrants, while in the case of negative self-selection of migrants, an increase in migration costs will reduce the expected education level of migrants to a country. Policy reforms changing the administrative costs of migration (captured by the parameter k 0 in our model) therefore have an oppositely signed impact on the education structure of migrants than increases in selectivity (captured by the parameter k 1 in our model) and the impact of a migration policy reform making the migration regime more selective in a country where migrants are negatively selected inter alia depends on whether the positive effects of a more selective migration regime outweigh the negative effects of making the migration regime more restrictive in general.
IV. Data and stylized facts
To empirically analyze the impact of the integration agreement legislation on the education structure of migrants, we therefore use data from a pooled sample of the Austrian Labor Force Survey (ALFS) from the years 2004 to 2007. In this representative quarterly survey, around 40,000 Austrian residents are asked for a number of personal characteristics (such as age, gender, educational attainment level and employment status) as well as for their country of birth and their year of immigration to Austria. Thus from this data it is possible to calculate the number of persons that migrated to (and still reside in) Austria from a particular country in a particular year. In addition, the data also provides ample information on the personal characteristics of this group. One limitation, however, is that we can only focus on migrants that were still residing in Austria in the time period from 2004 to 2007 and thus on permanent (or at least long-term) migration. 6 This, however, is arguably also the most relevant group, since the policy changes in 2003 were explicitly directed at persons with permanent settlement intentions and because among all migrant groups permanent migrants are most likely to have a lasting impact on the human capital endowment of their host country. A second limitation stems from the fact that the 1990s, aside from being a period of substantial institutional change in migration policy, were also particularly turbulent in terms of migration to Austria. During these years, the civil war in former Yugoslavia led to a massive increase in the number of Yugoslav refugees to Austria (see Figure 2 ). In addition, political developments in the home country may lead to distortions with respect to the education structure of migrants from developing and less developed countries. Thus for our benchmark results, we focus on migrants that settled in Austria in the years between 1997 and 2005 and compare migration to Austria from the EEA and other developed countries (excluding former Yugoslavia), which we define as those countries with an average human development index exceeding 0.8 in the years 1995 to 2005 (see Appendix 1). To check for the robustness of our results we, however, also perform a parallel analysis in which we compare EEA migrants to migrants from all other countries (including less developed countries but excluding Yugoslavia) and a further analysis in which we compare EEA-migrants to all other countries including Yugoslavia. Finally, the data are also subject to sampling errors. This is important in our context, since the number of migrants from some countries is too small to allow for reliable estimates of the structure of migration. To minimize this problem, aside from focusing on pooled data from 2004 to 2007, for descriptive purposes we consider both data on an annual frequency from 1997 to 2005 as well as data on three-year averages (i.e. 1997-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003-2005, respectively) , which are likely to be less prone to such error. Furthermore, we gauge the potential impact of measurement errors on our econometric analysis by also estimating models in which we exclude migrants from all sending countries for which we have less than 200 observations in our data, when considering the robustness of results. Thus the rather different development of permanent migration from all over the world and the EEA-countries suggests that comparing the EEA to the rest of the world may not provide the best comparison group. Permanent migration flows from other developed countries were much more in line with that of migration from the EEA in the time period considered. Here, migration figures were slightly below those from the EEA countries and almost moved in parallel to those of the EEA throughout the period. Figure 4 thus compares the education structure of permanent migrants from the EEAcountries to Austria to that from other developed countries as well as the rest of the world in the years from 1997 to 2005, by displaying the development of the share of permanent migrants with low (ISCED 2 or lower) educational attainment 7 from the EEA and the other developed countries, as well as all other countries both for annual data and for data aggregated over three-year periods. According to data aggregated for sub-periods, the gap in the share of permanent migrants with low educational attainment levels among other developed countries and the EEA-countries narrowed slightly after 2003. Relative to permanent migrants from all other countries, by contrast, the share of less educated permanent migrants from the EEA moved in parallel. This therefore suggests a rather mild impact of the reforms of residence law in 2003 on the education structure of permanent migration to Austria. This conclusion is reconfirmed when considering annual data (see: left-hand side of Figure 4 ): the share of the less educated permanent migrants from the EEA and other 7 We limit our analysis to a differentiation of qualified and unqualified migrants to avoid excessive measurement error, due to the small number of highly (i.e. tertiary) educated migrants in Austria.
developed countries as well as all other countries oscillated substantially both over the period before and after 2003. Here the share of low educated foreign born from the EEA was lower than from other developed countries for most of the pre-and post-reform period. 
V. Method
Descriptive evidence thus suggests at best a rather mild impact of the integration agreement regulation on the education structure of migrants. More robust empirical evidence on the impact of the reforms on the education structure of permanent migrants can be obtained by using a difference-in-difference approach. Here we exploit the fact that the integration agreement regulation applied only to migrants from outside the EEA, but not to migrants from EEA-countries. Dividing the data into a subset (denoted by R) of sending countries (j) that were affected by the reform and another subset that was unaffected, and grouping the time periods (t) into a pre-reform and a post reform period (with τ the period of reforms), the impact of a change in migration policy can be identified by the parameter δ in a logit regression of the form:
where ξ jit is a logistically distributed random disturbance term and y * jit is a latent variable measuring the probability of a migrant (i) migrating to Austria from country (j) in time period (t) being low educated (i.e. having an educational attainment of ISCED 2 or lower) with the observed variable (educational attainment) taking on the value 1 if the migrant has low educational attainment and 0 otherwise. D t is a set of dummy variables for each individual time period of migration, which measures changes in the education structure of migrants over time that are common to all sending countries, D j is a dummy variable for each sending country considered, which measures country specific (but time invariant) influences on the education structure, D s is a dummy variable for the survey year, X i is a set of individual characteristics that may impact on the education structure of migrants and Z jt is a set of time-varying sending country characteristics that influence the education structure of migration. α t , β j , λ, ρ S and γ are a set of parameter vectors to be estimated. The central parameter of interest in this regression is δ. This measures the average change in y * jit on the treated relative to the untreated migrant groups since D t≥τ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the time period under consideration is a postreform period (i.e. t ≥ τ ) and D j∈R is a dummy variable which takes on the value one if the country under consideration is a non-EEA-country. A statistically significant positive value of this parameter implies that (relative to EAA-countries) the share of low educated migrants from non-EEA-countries increased after the reform, while a statistically significant negative parameter implies that the share of low educated from non-EEA-countries reduced after reforms. Furthermore, as shown by Puhani (2012) the marginal effect on the interaction term D t≥τ D j∈R can be interpreted as the treatment effect. Table 4 presents the marginal effects of three logit models which differ with respect to the comparison group. In model 1 (on the left-hand side panel of table 4), we compare migrants from EEA-countries and other developed countries (excluding former Yugoslavia) in the time period 1997 to 2005. As already stated, we consider this our benchmark, because of the higher comparability of the developed countries to the EEA. In model 2 (central panel), we compare migrants from EEA-countries to all other countries (including the less-developed countries, but excluding former Yugoslavia). This comparison has the advantage of a larger number of observations than in the first case, but the disadvantage that migration from less-developed countries may be influenced by a number of factors (e.g. refugee migration), for which we cannot properly control. Finally, in model 3 (righthand side panel) we include all countries, including former Yugoslavia, in our comparison. In addition, the table presents marginal effects for both the specification in equation (3) as well as for a specification in which we allow treatment effects to vary over the posttreatment year. Aside from controlling for a full set of time, wave and sending country dummies (which are not reported in the tables), in all regressions, we also include (the log of) age and age squared as well as dummy variables for females, married persons and persons with children as controls for individual characteristics (i.e. our X j variables). We do this because previous research on Austria by Bock-Schappelwein et al. (2008) as well as other countries (Chiswick and DebBurman, 2004) shows that the educational attainment of migrants is nonlinearly related to age, that migrant women in general have lower educational attainment than migrant men and because there is also some evidence (BockSchappelwein et al. 2008) in Austria that, due to the impact of family reunion on the education-structure of migrants, married migrants and migrants with children have lower educational attainment than others. Thus these variables control for any potential shifts in the structure of migrants with respect to gender, age, and family status before and after the integration agreement legislation. The marginal effects of these controls are in line with expectations and previous results. The probability of a migrant having low educational attainment decreases with age but increases with age squared. This is consistent with the results of Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) , who also find a non-linear relationship between age and educational attainment of migrants. Female migrants have a significantly (around 8 percentage points) higher probability of having low educational attainment, when all countries are considered, while no significant effects can be found when considering only developed countries. This is primarily due to a particularly high share of less educated females among foreign born from Turkey in Austria (Bock Schappelwein et al, 2008) . Migrants with children on average have an 8 to 10 percentage point higher probability to have low educational attainment. The only variable that remains insignificant throughout is the dummy for married migrants. In addition, we also control for a number of time-varying sending country characteristics (the Z jt variables). These are the (logs of) annual US-Dollar GDP per capita taken from the United Nations Statistical Database, the infant mortality rate taken from UNICEF (www.childmortality.org), the share of low educated in the total population in five-year intervals (from Cohen and Soto, 2001) , as well as the five-year average of the Ginicoefficient of the income distribution (taken from the UNU-WIDER -World Income Inequality Database (WIID)). We include these variables because previous research (Beine et al. 2008) finds that the structure of emigration from a country depends on its level of economic development (proxied by GDP per capita and infant mortality) and the educational structure of the native population (proxied by the share of low educated among the resident population). The Gini-coefficient is included to control for effects of the income distribution in the sending country on the structure of migration, as suggested in the literature on migrant selectivity (e.g. Brücker and Defoort 2009). The marginal effects of these variables are often statistically insignificant. This is an indication that they provide to little variance to identify their effect on the education structure of migration after controlling for time and sending country fixed effects. The only exception is GDP per capita, which, however, is only on the margin of significance for the sample of developed countries. The central variables of interest are, however, the time-EEA interactions reported in the top rows of table 4. These indicate no improvement of the education structure of migrants from third countries (i.e. the treated group) relative to the education structure of migrants from EEA-countries (i.e. the untreated group) after the integration agreement regulation. Indeed, the estimates of the time-EEA interactions imply that, after reforms, the probability of a migrant from all countries outside the EEA being low educated (relative to that of a migrant from EEA-countries being low educated) increased significantly (by 9.3 percentage points) and when including former Yugoslavia (by 10.7 percentage points) in the comparison group. This result is, however, not robust and loses significance when considering the comparison to developed countries. In sum, the results are not very robust, but the majority of them point to a negative impact of the reform of residence laws in 2003 on the average educational attainment of third country migrants. In terms of our theoretical model, this can be interpreted as an indication that any potential positive impact of reduced education dependent costs of migration on the education structure of migrants was outweighed by the increase in fixed migration costs caused by the more restrictive migration regime. Alternatively, it could, however, also be argued that the number of people affected by the integration agreement regulation was too small and that thus other aspects of the migration regime (e.g. changes in the structure of family reunion migrants especially from third countries) were more important for overall changes in education structure in the time period considered. This seems to be all the more likely given that -as shown above -the reforms of 2003 affected only a relatively small segment of highly educated migrants.
VI. Results

VII. Robustness
These results could, however, be criticized for a number of reasons. First, as discussed above, focusing on the ALFS induces an element of measurement error to the estimates. Thus one could ask what the potential effects of measurement errors are. Second, as also shown above, most of our results indicate that controls for time-varying sending country characteristics remain insignificant. One may thus argue that these variables impact results. Similarly, one could ask what the impacts of controlling for individual characteristics are. Third, one may object to using the total foreign-born population, rather than active age groups. To address these issues, table 5 presents results for a number of alternative specifications of equation (3). First, we present results including only migrants coming from countries for which we have more than 200 observations. Second, we present marginal effects when focusing only on the population aged between 20 and 64 at the time of migration. Finally, we present results in which we excluded timevarying sending country variables (i.e. GDP per capita, share of low educated population, infant mortality and the Gini-coefficient) from the estimation, as well as a specification excluding individual variables (i.e. age, age squared, gender marital status and the dummy for children), to assess the potential impact of co-linearity of these variables with our period-EEA interaction terms. The impact of these changes is minor and provides few additional insights. As above, the results indicate that, after the integration agreement legislation, the share of migrants with low educational attainment settling in Austria from third countries increased relative to migrants from EEA-countries. The only additional insights here are that this marginal effect increases somewhat (to a 12.8 percentage point increase) when considering only countries with more than 200 observations, as well as when focusing only on the 20 to 64 year-old migrants. In total, these results, however, slightly strengthen the conclusion of a worsening education structure of migrants after the integration agreement reforms, since both when excluding sending country variables as well as when focusing only on large migrant groups, a significant increase in the share of low educated migrants from third countries to Austria emerges. Finally, a further issue with respect to our results is that we might have identified effects even in the absence of treatment. To address this issue, table 6 reports the results of a series of "placebo" treatments. For these, we estimated equation (3) imposing treatments in time periods where no treatment effects should be found. In particular, we used the fact that, before 1994, migration law stipulations applied to both migrants from EEA-countries as well as others and that therefore (irrespective of whether a reform in migration law occurred in that year or not) no treatment effects should be found with our method for the pre EEA-accession period. Table 6 : Marginal effects of a logit regression of the probability for a migrant being low educated for alternative "placebo" treatment periods Placebo treatment period We use data on migrants arriving in Austria from 1980 to 1993 (i.e. before EEA-accession) for these "placebo" treatments and impose a treatment in each year from 1986 to 1990, respectively. 8 We thus have one treatment (1990) in which a reform of migration law occurred and four in which no reforms occurred. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect for any of the placebo treatments when not allowing for time varying treatment effects, while when allowing for time-varying treatment effects among 20 coefficients estimated, one is significant at the 5% level and another at the 10% level. Thus our acceptance rate corresponds exactly to the predictions of statistical theory.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of the introduction of the integration agreement legislation in 2003 on the education structure of migrants. We find no compelling evidence that this regulation improved the education structure of migrants to Austria. Indeed, most of our econometric results, point to a (sometimes significant) negative impact of these reforms on the average education structure of permanent migrants. Our interpretation of this is that the implicit positive impact of the reforms on the education structure of migrants was countervailed by an increased restrictiveness of the migration regime in total, or that other aspects of the migration regime (in particular changes in the structure of family reunion migrants) were more important for changes in education structure in the time period considered. The results therefore present case study evidence which warns that reforms of migration law enacted to provide privileged access to highly educated permanent migrants may not yield the expected results, if other elements of the regulation system governing migration counteract these developments. 
